IS 'MAY I ASK YOU A QUESTION?' A QUESTION?I
M.K.C. Uwaieh lntroduction fu a linguist, I have been fascinated for several years now by the pragmatics of questions. I became specially interested in questions during a linguistics seminar here in Nigeria more than seven years ago. A colleague had, it seemed to me, been having considerable difticulty distinguishing questions clearly from certain other pragmalinguistic phenomena such as what he was calling 'summons'; so, since I found the intellectual challenge quite interesting, I decided then to clariff the issues involved, within the scientific paradigm in modern linguistics known as performative grammar.2 Now, my objective in this paper is to present an outline of my research results in this intellectual field of the study of questions. I shall make my presentation essentially through my review of and reaction to Richard L. Den's (1987) "Questioning and informationlibrary science".
Linguists are the experts on questions
In this section. I discuss the importance of Derr's (1987) article, but argue Lhat Den was very much mistaken not to have taken into consideration the contribution of linguistics to the subject of his study. I insist in effect that Derr's otherwise interesting article will benefit considerably from what linguistics could offer for the pragmatics of questions.
I This is a rcvised, updated version of a paper rvhich was prepared and accepted for publication inQuestioning Erchange ('Ibylor & Francis), but was unfortunatety not published before the journal's sudden 'clemise'. The article is being presented here for the readership of hagntalics because of the c0ntinued fundamcntal relevance of the issues raised thcre about the nature of questions for pragmatic studies in particular and the crucial rolc of communication context specification for linguistic analysis and description in general.
2 Per\omntive granmnr -no relation whatsocver of thc so-called performative hypothesis -is a context-sensitive andperfomtance approach to thc scientific characterisation of language, that takes into account in the formulation of a model of language the specific (kinds of communication contexts within which particular language textures are bona fde communicative constructs of language users.
: \r Derr (1987) was clearly addressing intbrmationflibrary scientists. These, according Io Dcrr, "generally have not attempted to clarify the concept of question"; they "use the term without offering an analysis or definition of it"; and their "practices suggest that intbrmationlibrary scientists appear not to recognise conceptual distinctions among the information-seeking expressions of users, and show no consistent usage in designating these expressions." In the light of the above indictmenl, Derr (1987) is in essence the report of Den's study of 300 informationseeking expressions actually posed to intermediaries in information systems -a study guided by the following three objectives: (i) the clarification of the question notion; (ii) the difterentiation of questions from other types of information-seeking expressions; and (iii) the systematic classiflcation of questions. These three preoccupations of Derr's will also guide my discussion in this paper implicitly, except that I shall consider the second and third objectives of Den's as peripheral and ancillary to the first, my real concern in this paper.
Notwithstanding the targeting of its readership in the information/library science discipline specifically, Den (1987) should be compulsory reading for any other discipline, like pragmatics, seriously concerned in one way or other with questions. I personally consider the article a landmark for sentences description. Whatever the shortcomings of his study, which I examine in the several main sections of this paper, Derr has had the courage to tackle the definition of a question; and'he is especially to be commended for his interesting scheme for subclassifying questions into eight distinct and apparently non-overlapping types: Very importantly, it should be intellectually fruitful to test with other serious studies, in addition to the present, the validity of Den's (1987) tindings for language communities besides that of English, from which his examples are drawn exclusively. Den (1987) himself is, unfortunately, silent about the scope of application of this theory of questions across language communities beyond that of English. However, everything considered, Derr (1987) as a contribution to the pragmatics of questions is decidedly important enough to merit some kind of useful rejoinder, such as this paper hopes to be.
To begin with, then, one thing that I categorically do not like about the article under discussion is that Den is apparently no respecter of linguists. The entire article, including the list of references, eloquently ignores any contribution linguistics may have made towards the resolution of the issues that concern Derr. The least expected of him in the context, I think, is that he be explicit enough about his intentions like Noica (1987) and say that he has indeed seen what linguists have to offer on the subject, but that he is not particularly impressed.
It is. of course, quite arguable that the type of 'questions' Derr (1987) purports to be interested in could be a class of objects which only informationflibrary scientists are experts in. But what Derr himself clearly says about questions in the paper under review here does not support that point. For example, according to him, Qucstions arc cxpressions which are designcd to make particular determinations regarding objects in the world. [...] Questions are representcd linguistically by interrogative sentences. Hencc, questions can be contrasl.cd with declaftrtive sentcnces which report detcrminations that previously have bcen made about ccrtain objects in the world. [...] A fundamental property of questions is that they posscss a distinct structurc. [...] Now, 'questions' like these -which Den says are "expressions", that are "represented linguisticallv by interrogative sentences", which "can be contrasted with declarative sentences". and which "possess a distinct structure" -are precisely the kind of entities that we linguists specialise in the study of. We -not informationlibrary scientistsnre, as languoge scientists, the experts on these and other language-specific phenomena. As such, Den certainly owes us linguists some explanation (if not an apology) regarding why he seems to imply, by his omission error, that what we linguists know about questions does not count (fbr informationlibrary science).
One might wish to excuse Derr's lapse on the grounds that his communication was after all clearly intended for the benefit of information/library scientists. Except that that contribution happens to be in an interdisciplinary journal (Questioning Exchange i:2, 1987) , where the goal is surely to educate all interested disciplines on the subject matter of questions. So, I maintain thaL Derr's otherwise remarkable article needs a rejoinder like mine to supplement his contributions with what linguists could currently offer on the pragmatics of questions.
A sentence is a question because of its illocutionary force
Before taking up Den (1987) on specific aspects of his study of questions, let me first in this section characterise questions generally. Accordingly, the term 'question' could in principle be said to refer to two main classes of phenomena in general: It may refer to (i) non-language entities, or to (ii) language entities. Non-language entities referred to by 'question' include a type of doirtg of something, an activity or process of some sort -as expressed with sentence example (1) below. Given that a question is not only a language entity generally but also a sentence especially, any definition of the phenomenon purports automatically to characterise the peculiar kind of language eiements that are necessarily members of the particular category of sentences. Specifically, then, a question sentence (i.e., a question. tor short) is hereby defined as a sentence whereby the language communicator communicates his desire to be informed about something. According to this detlnition, a sentence construct is a qucstion simply because the construct is recognised somehow to have a cluestion illocuticlnary status, which is the status of expressing its producer's illocutive intent to be intormed about something. Thus, in the usual parlance of contemporary Speech Act Theory,3 one is saying in ettbct by this definition that a question is a sentence construct which has the illocutionary force of seeking information about something -a question illocutionary force l-.eing thereby no more and no less than the language communicator"'s information-seeking intent rvhich is communicated with the pertinent sentence construct.
The notion of infclrmation' here, which is central to my definition of questions, deserves furthe r clarification immediately, tbr a better appreciation of my subsequent discussion about the nature of questions. Questions, as language entities that they are, are governed by the same overall conditions which govern language itself. Now, whatever else it may be, language is essentially a communication tool: We use language to communiate the realities of our consciousness to one another. Since the essence of communication is the transmission of information, the realities (i.e., preoccuputions) commwicated with questions as well as with other language 3l prefer thc (morc) correct appellation "Language Acts" insteadof "SpeechActs", since speech is (a kind oQ language, but language is not neccssarily spcech. Yct I will use "Speech Act Theory" because it is the estahlished name frtr the tradirion I am referrinu to. seekirtg' sentence construct. T'hc qLlcsti()n construct is said to be inherently 'information-seeking' here in the specific sense that its producer does communicate thereby thc intcnt that he seeks information (from the communicatee) about somethinu; a sentence construct is rtot information-seeking, and is therefore not a question. when its producer does ,ror communicate thereby the intent that he seeks intbrmation (frclm the communicatee) abclut something. For a sentence construct to be intormation-seekin,{, and hence become a question, it is therefore sufficient that its producer does c:ontmwticctte thereby the intent that he seeks information about something: it is /rol necessary. fbr example, that the language communicator should also be sirtccre about sceking the information purportedly sought with his sentence construct, because such a definition krad on 'questions' is ttot essential for determinin,q whether the language communicator has indeerl commtuicuted an intctrmation-sceking intent with his sentence construct. Similarly, and in clrder to drive home the point just made about questions, tor a sentence construct like sentence example (6) bekrw to qualify as an assertion it is sufficient that the producer communicltes an assertion with it; it is definilely not also necessary, for instance, that the sentenc:e producer concerned should also believe the claim communicuted with his sentence construct; in fact, it is not even necessary that the state of affzrirs beins cctmmunicated to be the case be true at all.
(6) It is rainins cats and dogs right now at the University of Benin main cirmpLls
Thus. tactrtrs such as that of the language communicator's sincerity in seeking the information purportedly sought with his sentence construct should really concern felicity conditions for the pragmatics of questions, but cannot reasonably be made essentieil characteristics for the nature of ouestions.
3. All questions are necessarily information-seeking Although I have detined questions in this paper essentially by the int<lrmation-seeking illocutionary force of the sentence constructs concerned, it is in fact not agreed by all scholars in the domain of study that all questions are fundamentally information-seeking expressions as I claim. Derr's (1987) article itself under review here is inexplicably silent about whether or not there are questions which are not informirtion-seeking; and that is the issue I wish to address in this section. For Den (1987) , 'questions' are those sentences rvhich traditional grammar calls 'interrogatives', and they are recognisable by what he calls their "distinct structure".a Derr describes this their "distinct structure" in his l9U7 article under review as follows:
Qucstions consist clf two parts: (i) subject. a term or terms referring to an object about which some type <lf <letermination is being sought; and (ii) query, an cxpression that identifics the particular determination u'hich is being sought.
I shall show in this section that, following Derr's insight presented above, and mine in particular as outlined in the preceding section, every question qua question is necessarily information-seeking. The point of emphasising here that all questions are necessarily information-seeking is that I wiish to highlight how we should apply this definition criterion igorously in order to clistinguish clearly between genuine questions. which do ltnve the inherent information-seeking characteristics of questions but may be sometimes erroneouslv considered to be non-informationseeking because of incidental features like the sincerity of the questioner, and o D"r', (1987) usage of 'structure'here rJeserves some commcnt immediately. Den clearly believes that the bipartite componenL) (of 'subject' and'query') he attributes to every 'question' (or 'interrogative') sentence is rcaliscd in an individual languagc like English (from which he draws all his examplcs) in some distinctive syntactic pattern. Although I criticisc this structure-determined categorisation framework in some detail latcr in the fifth and sixth sections cspecially of this paper, it is worth mentioning herc briefly that applving strictly the structural criterion of Der's (1987) categorisation method, one cannot rcasonablv account for sentenccs ii and iii below beingrequestsrather than questions too like sentence i -according to his classification scheme, which I present later in detail in section 5 of this paper.
i. Question ii.
Request iii.
Request -How docs X compare with Y'/ -May I have information on X? -MavldoX? ln a structurc-bascd approach to sentence description like that of Derr (1987) and thosc of all mainstream linguistic studies from Ancicnt Indian and Greek grammatical descriptions to Ttansformational generative grammar, a question-intent, and therefore a question category, is attributed to a sentcnce because of its stntcture (i.e., components construction pattern); in a contextbased approach to sentencc dcscription like performative grammar's, thc question-intent, and therefore the question category, attributcd to a scntencc is deducible from the contextual indices for the given language communication act, and the sentence's slructurc itsclf is onl one possible but non-obligatory wav for manifesting the communicator's question intent in the communication context. pseudo-questions. which look very much like questions by their structure but on close scrutiny arc in tact tound to lack the intbrmation-seeking illocutionary torce of questions.
For Hans vatt der iv,leij Q 9U7) in his "Assumptions of information-seeking questions". some sentences of the structurally recognisable interrogative sentences Den (1987) refers to exclusively as'questions' are not information-seeking. Thus, varr der Meij lists among such questions which he considers to be non-intbrmationseeking the following: Leading questions, politeness questions, rhetorical questions, knorvn-answer questions, and criticism or objection questions. All so-called noninformation-seeking questions arguably have the following trait in common, that when the questioner poses his question, he, for one reason or the other, does nol really need to have the information purportedly solicited by his question. And the dift'erent reasons for the questioner not needing to have the information ostensibly required by his question are presumably what also characterise respectively the different types of the so-called non-infbrmation-seeking questions. For example, an objection/criticism type of supposedly non-information-seeking question is ostensibly concerned essentially with seeking some counterpoint (in argument), rather than wrth having any intormation as such; a known-answer type of supposed noninformation-seeking question is fundamentally preoccupied with. say, confirming that the answer to the question provided by the communicatee is the same as that already knclwn to the communicator. not with gaining the information per se :l:ttnr.U by the communicatee's answer in his new role as communicator; and so Thke, for iilustration of the above presentation, a knclwn-answer question exemplar, such as sentence (7) below is interpretable to be if posed in an appropriate classroom situation by a competent teacher with the pertinent question illocutionary force to her English literature class students, say. (7) Who is the author of Homlet?
According to t,r/n der Meij's (1987) position on the matter under cliscussion, sentence (7) as presented above is not information-seeking. But, as Derr (1987) has satisfactorily demonstrated, the sentence obviously has the structure typical of questions according to his hypothesis: The teacher in the communication context of our imagination has ostensibly designed it to comprise: (i) a suhjeu, a particular object (Hamlet, here) about which some determination is being sought; and (ii) a query, an expression (here, 'Who is the author of (it)?), which specifies the particular kind of determination being sought. We are dealing in effect with the second category tvpe of questions, according to Den's (1987) questions classiflcation scheme I presented earlier in section 1 of this paper -that of ldettitl' or the 'WhoAVhat is X'l' type. As the particular determination being sought with her sentence construct by the teacher in our illustration -namely, the identity of the author of Hamlct -does constitute (a piece ol in.formatiott, it follows clearly that our sentence example here, even though a known-answer type since the competent teacher of the sentence exzrrnple 7 in question knows the answer to her question (and therefore by implication of vart der Meij's (1987) hypothesis is t t supposedly a non-information-seeking type of question), rs in actual fact informatiortseekirtg. Furthermore, I myself would explain the matter under cliscussion here in my sentence classification scheme as tollows. When the teacher-questioner produced sentence example (7), her communicated intent for thc communication context I have described would be rightly said to be a desire to be intormed about something (i.e., who the author of Hamlet is). The related datum that the teacher already knows what she is purportedly seeking to know (and theretore admittedly does not need to know per se) must be clearly distinguished here from the incontrovertible fact that she lns erpressed her desire to be itfonned. Whether her question-sentence is information-seeking is in etfect determined by what she is up to rvith it (here, the expression of her desire to be intorrned about something) -i.e., by its communicator's communicated intent, or by the sentence's illocutionary fbrce according tct Austinian terminology -and ruil by her gocld faith or any other extraneous consideration relative to her langullge act. In short, the teacher's knowing the answer to her question is surely a telicity conditicln of her questioning language act that has here clearly rtot made it impossible for her to communicate at the same time that she desires to know the information she already knows -which is all that is needed for her question scntence construct to be recognised as 'intormationseeking'. Or, to tlog the point a little morc. using a mundane analogy this tirne, if a person holding a knit'e with the left hand is nonetheless at the same time fbund engaged in the activities aimed at discovering with the right hand that silme knife, we may indeed make various inferences (sorne of them presumably not very charitable) about the character or mental state of that person; but we have to admit that he is lookirry for tlrc knife, no matter what conclusions our inferences amount to regarding his personalit,v. Thus. we see from this brief analogy that a knownanswer question (a suppilsed example of non-information-seeking questions) does nol lclse its informzrtion-seeking character merelv because it is the case that the questione.r alreadv knows the answer ilf thc cluestion purportedly sought by hcr/his quesuon.-Rerisoning along the same lines as abovc. we can easilv arrive at the general conclusion tlrat the lack of any real need to have some information purportedly sought with one's sentence c:onstruct (which characterises all so-called noninformation-seeking 'questions') does tnt bv itself remove an information-seeking t It is, of coursc, obviou! that thc compctcnt teachcr ol'mv sentcncc cxample (7) nray be verl' accuratclv said to be (rndirectlv.; sccking information u'ith hcr se ntcncc construct abctul whether her .stutlents concentad do know'who the author ctf Huntlat is; but I do not use this obvious cscape hatch (of attributing this particular information-sccking intention obligatorily to lhe teacher of the sentencc cxample 7) for making my point. In linc t'ith my 'lost' knifc illustration, I do claim in fact that even if the tcacher of my scntcnce cxample 7 or anv other similar communicator (who knowing the answcr to the qucstion vct poses it) had no other justification than that o[ purporting to seek information for producinq a questit)n-construct, thcn that language construct would surcly still be information-secking simplv bccause thc communicatrlr had imposed an information-seeking illocutionarv forcc on thc lanquaqe act.
illocutionary force (which charac:terises questiclns inherently).o Therefore, we can draw the more general conclusion from the above discussion regarding the nature of questions -given Derr's (1987) and my insights in the matter -that every question qua question is necessarily an information-seeking expression. That a question sentence (i.e.. a question) necessarilv has an informationseeking illocutionary fbrce should be quite obvious, I think. So, it is instructive for a better understanding of the character of questions to attempt to ascertain why scholars like ycrr der Meij (1987) are tempted to deny this fairly obvious fact. I have identified so far rwo possible reasons for the error, apart from that of confusing defining rvith incidental characteristics of questions already discussed above.
One possible reason cctuld be that the expressions such scholars are calling 'questions' are not really questions at all (in that they lack the characteristic illocutionary force clf questions) but are confused with true questions because they do have the kincl of stntcture the scholars generally assoc:iate with questions. The English greeting formula presented as sentence example (B) below clearly talls into this cateqory of pseudo-questions -that is. the category of rtort-questions.
How do vou do?
There is with this expression as generally used in the English-speaking community I am tamiliar with no information-seeking intent as such communicated by the communicator: anil its proper translation into another language would presumably need an (approximately) equivalent non-intirrmation-seeking expression of that target language. if' the two corresponding cultures are largely isomorphic in this respect. My argument in this paragraph is thus that it is pragmatically perverse to even regard as questions sentence constructs like my sentence example 8 above which clearly do lack anv cluestioning (i.e., information-seeking) illocutionary force to start with, no matter how well thev might resemble genuine questions structurally.
Another possible reason why sorne scholars might erroneously deny the obvious fact that every question qua question must have a questioning (i..., information-seeking) illocutionary force inherently is that a particular sentence construct might be'illoctttit,ely ambigltoLts' -that is, in spite of its having the kind of structure considered tct he typrcal of questions, it may not be a question, or it may be a question, depending on what exactly the communicator's actually communicated illocutionary intent is correctly recognised to be in the communication situation. A good example of this illocutively ambiguous category of expressions is sentence example (9) below, addressed by a close friend, szly, to a communicatee-hero who has just had an zrccident.
Are you alright?
6 My statcment herc rhat the lack of any rcal need to havc stlme inforntation purportcdly sought with one's sentencrc construcl (which apparcntly characterises all so-called 'non-information-sceking questions') docs nr)t by itsclf removc an information-sceking intent (which characterises qucstions inherently) obviously cannot reasonably imply that anv sentence which is labclled a 'non-informalionseeking question' must automaticallv bc information-sccking. As I argue in this section, some of these so-callecl 'questions' are not rcally qucstions, and thcrefore should understandably not be information-sccking.
(ft)
The commurricator could have actually communicated the intent that he seeks to know rvhether his friend hzts come out of the accident without any (serious) injury, in which cetse the sentence construct example (9) is a question; or he could in reality have communicated the intent that he is hoping his friend is not hurt (seriously) in the accident, in which case the sentence construct example (9) is not a question. Accordingly, my argument here is that a scholar like van der Meij (1987) who believes there are non-information-seeking questions could be mistaken and led to deny the inherent intbrmation-seeking character of questions because of the nonquestion (and therefore of course non-information-seeking) interpretation possible for an illocutively ambiguous construct like sentence example (9) above which does have the kincl of structure traditionally associated with E,nglish interrogatives. The main arguments in this section hopefully advance convincingly .y principal thesis in this section about the importance of distinguishing clearly between genuine questions and pseudo-questions through a rigorous application of my proposed pragmatic definition tor questions. Following this procedure, we note, for instance, that all so-called 'non-information-seeking questions' do rtot have the said pragmatic strltus: While the greeting formula sentence example 8 above (an exemplar of the so-called 'non-infirrmation-seeking questions') is rrr.rt a question because on close scrutiny it is found to lack a questioning (i.e., inforrnation-seeking) illocutionary force, a rhetorical question (another exemplar of so-called 'noninformation-seeking questions') may bc a question indeed -when it is actually recognised correctly in communication contcxt to have an infbrmation-seeking illocuticlnary force -even though its producer does not really expect/intend that the purported information-seeking desire communicated with his construct should be fulfilled by the communicatee. More importantly. we also see in this section how the tnformation-seeking defining character of questions is not eroded/removed by a nondefining characteristic like the lack of need for the infclrmation purportedly sought with a sentence construct by a languaqe communicator.
A question sentence can also be a request sentence
It is in the nature of language as a communication tool that sentence constructs may be 'illoctttiv,elv douhle-banelled' -by which I mean that the communicator may sometimes impose two illocutionary fbrces simultaneouslv on the same sentence construct. When this happens, it is possible for the same sentence tcl be, simultaneously, botlt tt question-sentence (or question) and a request-sentence (or request) -which is the primary concern of my discussion in this section.'
/ In rcstricting my discussion of illocution cloublc-barrclling in this section to questions and requcsts only, I dcfinitely do not thereby imply that only question and requcst illocutionary forces are double-trarrcllcd. On the contrary, it is my hvpothcsis in performative grammar that illocution double-barrelling applies to all illocutionary categories of sentences. Howcver, I am specifically concerned in this section of mv discussion with demonstrating that Den's (1987) study was wrong to posit that sentcnrcs correctly labelled as 'qucstions' cannot also at thc same time be request sentences; and I make this demonstration accordingly, with mv 'illocutionary double-barrelling' doctrinc, by ar_euing that thc language communicltor mav somctimes impose rwo illocutionary forccs (here, of request and question specificallv) simultancously on the same sentence construct. Rather surprisingly, Den (1987) seems to preclude the existence of the type of request exemplified by sentence (10) above -recognising only requests types that could be exemplified with sentence (12) below.
(12) Can you tell me who killed Julius Caesar'l According to mv own hypothesis in this domain of Speech Act studies, the language communicator targets with his communication during a language performance different kinds of his relationship with the communicatee; one of such relationships is that of power status; and Tiaditional Grammar's 'imperatives', which I call 'commands' like Den (1987) , provide a good illustration of this power status factor. I define a command zls a sentence construct whereby the language communicator communicates to the communicatee the intent that something be doen. Thus, Derr's (1987) definition of 'requests' I quoted earlier is roughly suitable for all commands, according to my understanding. Now, the power status factor mentioned in this paragraph applies io commands as follows. Relative to the communicatee, the language communicator finds himself obligatorily in a kind of power play with respect to the command sentences (i.e., commands) -such that when he communicates to the communicatee with his sentence construct that something be done he has to specify also somehow his power status with regard to the asking. Power status degrees of relationship in language performance between communicator and communicatee probably constitute something of a continuum, ranging possibly from abject subordination at one extreme to autocratic domination at the other extreme; however. with specific reference to commands, it is correct, I think, and convenient for our purpose here, to classifo all the power status shades imaginable into two principal command types: (i) orders and (ii) requests. An'order', as I define it, is in eftect a demartd of some sort: The communicator communicates somehow that he compels the communicatee to do something he is asking to be o Den's (1937) own exemplars of the tliffercnt kinds o[scntcnces in his sentences classification scheme is prescnted in hte next sccticln of this paper. done. A 'request', as I dcfine it, lacks this compulsion factor in the asking, and, in this specific sense, may be said to be'soft command'-in opposition to an order (i.e., a demand) as earlier deflned, which is correspondingly a'hard command'. To illustrate the above, sentence example 10 earlier presented would be a good example of a request as I define it if by the use of 'please' in the sentence'/ the language c:ommunicator's communicated illocutive intent wrth the construct is precisely that his asking for something to be done (i.e., to be told who killed Julius Caesar) lacks compulsion. Similarly. sentence example (1 1) would be a good exemplar of rlrders as I define them if by the absence of 'please' (or of some other similar dominance-reducing device) in the sentence the language communicator's communicated illocutive intent with the constrr.rct is precisely that in his asking for something to be done he is making a demand -i.e., that he is compelling the communicatee to do the thinq. The fact of the matter, as I shall argue first of all in this section, is that requests may sometimes be couched in the structural pattern associated traditionally with questions; and that when they are so couched it seems reasonable to refer to such sentences either as questions (constructs used for requests), or as requests (presented in the structural pattern traditionally associated with questions) -which would explain, even if it cloes not fully justifv,r0 thc use of 'questions' anci 'requests' ' Ar I shall emphasise later in thc last scction of this paper, structural critcria, such as the presencc or abscnce of the languagc unit'plcase' in scntcnce examplcs (10) and (11) or the syntactic pattern of scntcncc (12), constitute onlv ntarginal (i.e., insufficient) antl corroborativc hclp for ascertaining tho requisite illocutive intcnt of the language communicator undcrlying his sentence construct: Contextual indice-s arc thc ultimatc critcria frrr establishing that intent. What this last point implics in specific tcrms with respepct to the scntence examplcs of my illustration in this section is, for examplc, that is quitc possible lor a sentencc of English in ivhich 'please' as a language unit occurs to bc an order (i.e., a hard command), whilc a scntence construct that lacks 'plcase' or any other explicit dominance-rcducing language unit could vct constitute a request (i.e., a soft command) -depending on what contcxtual indices do rcveal the communicator's exact communicated illocutive intent to bc, irrespective of what his languagc units per .rc seem tcl show that intent to be. This same rcasoning about the ovcrriding rolc of context vis-d-r'is languagc tcxture applies of course also to svntactic patterrn: Thus, dcpcnding on thc context, sentence examplc 12 may in fact not be a rcquest but an ordcr, irrcspective of its structure.
10 l-t," usage is not fully justiiied because it is imprccise: Communication contcxt, not sentence structurc, is thc ultimatc basis fur detcrminin{ a communicator's communicatcd illocutionary force, and thcrcforc f()r cstablishing the ilkrcution cat(]sory ol that scntonce -as I cxplain in some dctail in the last seclion of this papcr. The precise usaqc for thc two senlence illocution catcgorics of interchangeably by information,4ibrary scientists or by any other scholars for the same sentences or types of sentence constructs. Thus, the non-compulsion command illocutionary intent expressible rvith sentence (10) below for example could equally well be expressed with sentence (12) (13) and (14). Den classifies them, and all other identical construction types presumably, as reqLtesls. But this classification of Dcrr's is only partially correct, in that it reflects ortly one of the possible interpretations of the constructs' ilklcutionary torce. The communicatee concerned in the above examples ctl Den's could well reply (in his new role as communicator) "Yes" (i.e., "Yes,, I inform you tlnt you may have material on steam fitting and boiler work"/'Yes, I inform yott lhal vou may renew Intercom magazine for anclther week") in response to the communicator's sentence (13) or (14) as the case may be; and then. also in response, proceed to give the material required according to sentence example (13) assuming thereby from contextual indices that the communicatur of sentence (13) was not only seeking to know whether he might have the material concerned but also requesting to actually have it if the answer was 'Yes') or to process the rertewal of the magazine mentioned in sentence example (14) (assuming thereby from contextual indices available that the communicator of sentence (14) was not only seeking to know whether he might renew the httercom magazine in question but also requesting to actually renew it if the answer was 'Yes'). According to the plattsible illocutionary forces interpretation above uttibutable to sentence constructs (13) and (14), given the affirmative reply 'questions'and'reque:sts'under discussion hcrc should designatc a given sentence, irrespective of its structure, catcgoricallv as 'qucstion' clr/and 'rcquest' dcpcnding strictly on the communicatclr's communicalcd illocutionarv intcnt(s), as dcduciblc from its communicati()n contcxt. and respective action in response to those constructs, it is clear that by this particular interpretation (which I certainly do rtot claim to be the only alternative besides Derr's own in such circumstances) those two given sentences must be regarded here as botlr questions and requests ttt the same time. And I suggest that it is especially such illocutively douhle-banelled expressiorts which may quite coffectly be designated interchangeably as'questions'or'requests'-by the informationlibrary scientists whose usage Derr (1987) indicts, or by anybody else for that matter.
Any information-seeking sentence may be a question
In this section and the next of this paper, I am concerned with targetting, in difterent ways, the fundamentalweakness of Derr's (1987) classification principle for questions -that it is srructttre-based. While the next section will emphasise that several different contextually deducible illocutionary torces can be expressed by the same langua-Ee structure. this section shows how several different sentence structures may convey the same contextually deducible illocutionary force; and argues that it is, praematically speaking, unreasonable to refuse that such illocutively identical sentences be designated with a common name in recognition of their common illocution category.
Another result of the supposed theoretic confusion regarding the status of questions, which Den (1987) was complaining about, is "the practice" among information/library scientists "of assuming that one term applies to all informationseeking expressions of users". The substance of Den's contention may be conveniently illustrated with Den's own exemplars for the different kinds of expressions in his sentences classification scheme, as presented below (where'X'in all the expressions designates any object about which information is being sought):
How does X compare with May I have information on May I do X? I need information on X. I want information on X. Find intormation on X.
X.
Y? X?
According to Den, onlv his first expression exemplar above constitutes a question; and, tor him, it is irtcorrect therefore to use the term 'question' for any other expression token on the list. The basis for his position is that he believes only the first expression exemplar has the "distinct structure" he defines questions by.tt My own position is that Den's usage of the term 'question' is unnecessaily restictive, as I arsue hereafter. Irrespective of purely structural considerations, what exactly is designated by 'questions' may depend essentially on who is using the term, when. For example, teachers would normally, and we would all think quite correctly, designate as 'questions' during an examination the followingcommand-type r"ni.n..r iy Den's categorisation or imperatives by more popular traditional typification. From Den'.r own disclosures on the matter,, it is obvious that informationlibrary scientists on their part do, like teachers, frequently use the term 'questions' technically in their line of work to refer to any information-seeking expressionswhether they happen to be of the restricted group of sentences Derr recognises as questions or those others he would call requests, commands, statements, and truncated expressions. As we can see from this discussion, then, the context of usage itself may render the term 'questions' perfectly acceptable for any intormationseeking expression. Secondly, Den (1987) himself is rather confusing in his usage of the term 'structure'; and once this confusion in his usage is straightened out, one can easily see how it is reasonable for the informationlibrary scientists Der (1987) is complaining about to designate any information-seeking sentence of users as a 'question'. By one interpretation, Den (1987) uses 'structure' to refer to two related parts of the kind of sentence wherein those parts designate two related, specific types of realities as explained hereafter: The 'subject' part of the sentence designates "an object about which some type of determination is being sought", and the related 'qnery' part designates "the particular determination which is being sought".l2
Following strictly this interpretation of 'structure', Derr's (1987) examples of 'question', 'request', 'command', and'statement'presented in this section should a// actually be questions because each of them has a 'subject' part ('X', in the examples, designating an object about which some type of determination is being sought), and the related 'qr.r"ry' part (an accompanying expression in each of the examples, designating the particular determination that is being sought, specitically in each case information about 'X'). By this first interpretation of Derr's 'structure' the information/library scientists whose usage Derr (1987) indicts are in fact right, by Den's own definition of 'questions' in terms of their "distinct structure", to call the several information-seeking expressions just mentioned'questions'. But, since Den (1987) does classify these expressions dffirentll' (i.e., with only one of the examples as a question type), it must follow that he is using some other interpretation of 'structure' besides the one just discussed in the last paragraph. By this interpretation number two of 'structure', the term appears to refer to a particular kind of patteru o,f setfience orgunisation: Here, 'questions' expressions for
Den are "designecl" such that they are "interrogative sentences".l3 Following this second interpretation, only sentences with the construction pattern traditionally associated with so-called'interrogatives'can be questions according to Derr. Aligning this second interpretation rvith the first (i.e., giving Derr benefit of the doubt by assuming, charitably, that the two possible interpretations are not mutually exclusive),, an interrogative sentence is a question or has the status of a question (by designating "an object zrbout which some type of determination is being sought" and also designating "the particular determination which is being sought") because of its construction pattern; in other words. a sentence's underlying illocutive intent, and thereftlre illocution category, is determined by the sentence's construction pattern; or still. a sentence's oonstruction pattern brings about that it conveys such an illocutionary intent of the communicator, and is therefore classified as such an illocution category -accordingto Den. But the reasoning just oulined is easily shclwn to be false. using the following two sentence examples ctf Den's: tt By'1.u**unication) context'throughout this papcr I am refcrring of course to the particular circuntstanccs (of which thc location for thc communication is only one factor) that govern how a given scntcncc construct is produced by a language communicator to transmit inlbrmation to a communicatce. My model of communication context (comprising seven principal factors, called 'variables') is prescnted in Uwajth (1993 Uwajth ( , 1994a Uwajth ( , 1994b .
understanding is the general culture of silence regarding the crucial role of context in the analvsis and description of sentence constructs.r) Consider, for illustrirtion, sentence example (20) Derr (1987) , using his structure-based approach, would sav categorically that it is rtot a question -judging by his explicit statements about the illocution status of sentence examples (13) and (14) alreacly presented in this paper.
(13) May I have material on stearn fitting and boiler work'? (14) May I renew Intercom magazine for another week?
Den (1987) would call these two and other similar constructions requesls -which, as we have seen in this paper, he cclnsiders to be difterent not only from questions but also even from commands. But, as we saw in the fourth section of this paper, any of these two sentences could in fact be botlt a question and a request, depending on the communicator's communicated illocutive intent(s) deducible in the context of communication. Much more obviously, and it is simply amazing that Den (1987) did not seem to consider this possibility at all, each of the sentences could be exclusively a question, and not in anv way a request. Or, thirdly, each of the sentences might be only a request. and not in any' wav a question -in line with Den's preferred analysis they are not. Which exactly is the case is determinable ultimately only with reference to the actuiil context of communicaticln, and not by an appeal to the overall structure of the construct in question. These same, above-mentioned illocutionary lirrce possibilities in context for sentence constructs (13) and (14) are also applicable to sentence construct (20) as I shall now proceed to demonstrate. Consider, then, for instance, a situation whereby the communicatee's response to sentence exzimple (20) is to produce in turn sentence example (21) Clearly. one plattsible reason (i.e., arguably not the only one imaginable) tbr the production of sentence (21) Here, a plausible (hence again, not the only imaginable) contextually deducible illocutive intent of the communicator of sentence (20), which gave rise to the bipartite sentence (22), would in fact be that he is not only seeking thereby to know whether he may ask the communicatee a question but also requesting to be allowed to do so (i.e., to be allowed to actuallv do the asking of the said question) in the case that the communicatee's answer to his question should be in the afflrmative. My primary argument being made with the illustraticlns and discussion above in this section is not the obviously spurious claim that this or that illocutive intent interpretation for sentence (20) must tollow necessarily because of this or that sentence-construct-response of the communicatee's. but rather to demonstrate that the several differenr illocutive intent interpretations I have suggested are indeed plattsible explanations for the communicatee's dfferent sentences-responses (2i), (22), and (23) to the same sentence example (20) -irrespective of this sentence's structure. As to which exactly of these several illocutionary intents is correct for sentence construct (20) (24) The use of ultrasonography in the measurement of the axial length of the eve.
It is also definitely ,tot my intention in this paper to defend the thesis that sentence structure is completely irrelevant for the illocutionary theory of sentences constructs. No, my position within the performative grammar paradigm in the matter is that sentential constructs by themselves (i.e., by their structure) are, generally speaking, an insufficient guide tor discovering the communicator's communicated illocutive intent; that, instead of sentence structure, communicatictrt context is the ubsolute gtide as to the cornmtuicator's commwicated illoctttive irilent. Thus, a sentence's make-up per se is, in my estimation, only a rouglt index towards a specific type of illocutive intent; the construct is necessaily supplemented with, even ov,enidden by, contextual indices -such as body posture, a telling cough, the topic of conversation, ambient events like handshakes or toasts, an accompanying frown or smile or blush or sneer, the size of spatial gap between the communicator and communicatee, etc. -which invariably go to direct and focalise the intelligent gLtesses (that all the communicatee's decodings of the communicator's language performance ultimately are, anyway) regarding the language communicator's exact communicated illocutive intent.r6 Ultimately, the case for a context-based approach to the illocutionary categorisation of sentences rests on this basic fact, that whereas a language communicator does not necessarily intend the illocutionary force which his sentence construct alone would have us believe he intends, the contextual indices of that language act necessarily do stipulate what illocutive intent he has imposed on his communication, whatever the structure of his sentence construct.
Given the central thesis above highlighted and discussed in this paper, it seems to me, at this point in time of my understanding of the issues involved, that the correct approach for the illocution-level categorisation of sentences is nol to assert dogmatically that such or such types of sentence patterns are such or such illocution types, but that with such or such an illocutive intent, as deducible from the actual contextual indices of the language communication act, then such or such structures are likely to reflect it for this or that given language. In short, the language communicator's illocutive intent communicated is the crrterion for the illocutionary classification of his sentence construct; and the actual particular communication context of that sentence construct, ttot iIs structure by itself, is the ultimate basis for ascertaining the language communicator's communicated illocutive intent for his sentence construcl.
'o Since the communicatee's decoclings of the communicator's language performanc e are gtresses (howbeit intelligcnt) of the communicator's communicated intent, it goes without saying that the communicatee could still be nistaken about the communicator's exact illocutivc intent despite all the available contextual clues of a qiven communication.
ltI.K.C. Lln'ajclr 7. Conclusirtn As indic:ated at the beginning of this exposition. this paper has been concerned with presenting the results of my research findings in the domain of the prasmatics of questions, through a revicw clf and rcaction to Derc's (1987) article on questions. The findings I have discussed in this paper may be summarised as fcllklws, in line with the heading for cach of the sir major sections of the paper.
First. rvhen questions iire taken to be kinguaue entities, as Den (1987) considers thcnr. thcn thcy fall squarelv within thc purview of linguistics' preoccupations: and anv other discipline that exarnines their nature cannot reasonably afford to ignore thc c:ontribr-rtions of lingLrists' investigutions in thc dclmain. Second, the ill<tcutive intent which characterises questiclns rs that of secking to be informed about something; it shouid bc of immense intcrest tbr subsequent rvork on the pragmatics of questions to elucidate the relation between (at least some) nonlanguagc entities also called 'questions' and these intirrrnation-seeking language entities under scrutinv here. 'fhird, there are, applying nry definition concerned rigonluslv. no qucstions qua clr.rcstions which are not information-seekin_u: When apparent questions do prove to bc non-information-seeking, it is either because (i) non-defining. irtciderttol cha,rtrctcristrcs oi questions (like the language communicatrtr's lack ol' sincerity in seeking informaticln) are being errc)neously used to argue that gcnuine questions (which urc othcrwise in f'act information-seeking) are supp<rsedly non-intormution-seeking; or because (ii) the structure traditionally associated with questiilns. nol any question illocutionary force at all, is being used erroneously to parade ,ron-question sentences -of illclcutively ambiguous constructs or otherwise -as'questions' (that are supposedly non-information-seeking). Fourth, sentences mav he ilkrcutivelv double-trarrelled, rvhen the language communicator imposes two ilkrcutionary forces simultaneously on the same sentence; ernd, in that case, a sentence cclrrectly designated a 'que stion'rnay sometimes also quite corrcctly be called a 'request'. Fifth, the seconcl pclstulate above that the illocutionary churacter of questions scntenccs is that of seeking intbrmation takes precedence over purelv structural conside rations for defining ur determining questions -such that several structurally dissimilar sentenccs are all necessarily questions if thev are all information-seeking. Sixth, contrrrry Io Der's (19u7) and the traditional position in the miltter, comrnuniurtion c()ilte.yt. not sentence structure, is the ultirnate basis filr detcrmining a sente nce's c'omnlunicated illocr.rtivc intent, and therefore for its possible classification as a question. Iv{v overall objective in this paper has been to demonstrate with the study of questions thc importance of pcrfurrlative grammar's fundamental pclstulate about the crucizil role of communication context in linguistic analysis and description. I wcluld be pleascd to reccivc rcactions rvhich pnlvidc other insights zrbout questions. 
